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ABSTRACT 
 
Disasters such as hurricanes disrupt the lives of everyone in their path. The preparation 
for and response during and after such an event can make all the difference for those 
involved. Past hurricanes need to be learned from, hurricanes such as Katrina and Hugo; 
lessons learned from events like these can be applied in future ones such as they were in 
Sandy and Gustav. This thesis reviews past research done concerning problems and 
themes of unsafe situations during hurricanes in urban centers, finding these themes and 
making suggestions to be used in the future to attempt to prevent future re-occurrences. 
By reviewing historical hurricanes in urban centers, responses to these events that have 
been seen as unsuccessful or misguided can be studied for lessons to learn can further be 
utilized.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
Background 
Natural disasters are a phenomenon that is a fact of life, there is no escaping their 
effects beyond getting out of their path. That is not always an option, as cities cannot 
evacuate from the destruction path as living beings can, but oftentimes do not. Ninety-
one percent of Americans live in moderate to high risk locations for disaster; 217 million 
people were affected directly by disasters globally in 2010 and nearly 80% of those were 
storms and floods (Amanda Ripley, 2012, p.vi-1) 
Due to these facts, it is the responsibility of those in power to react to, respond to, 
and recover from disasters in an appropriate and effective manner. Appropriate response 
measures include serious concerns toward citizen and emergency worker safety in the all 
emergency phases. A governing body is responsible for anything that happens during 
disaster events and the lessons to be taken from them. 
 Past disaster events can teach many things as reoccurring themes emerge. Each 
one teaches something new as it affects each community in new ways not previously 
anticipated or for which no preparation occurred. These lessons build on previous ones, 
and if applied correctly can greatly improve the response and recovery period for all 
affected. 
 Preparation before a disaster, response to a disaster, and recovery from a disaster; 
these phases originate from governmental bodies and trickle all the way through the 
community to those emergency workers and citizens on the street level, the “boots on the 
ground” as it were. These decisions on preparation activities as well as response choices 
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affect not only recovery as mentioned previously, but also the safety of those on the 
ground level. Additional preparation and response decisions must be made to protect 
civilians and emergency workers during the chaos of a disaster event where law and order 
is not always prepared in relation to supplies or physical presence on the scene.  
 Hurricane Hugo made landfall on September 17th, 1989 at St. Croix on the U.S. 
Virgin Island. It was a Category 4 hurricane that did enough damage to cut the island off 
from the outside world. St. Croix keeps in contact with the mainland via telephone lines 
and transmitted means, but the hurricane destroyed phone lines and relay towers for 
transmissions to the mainland. 
 St. Croix was not unprepared, but was struck harder than anticipated, “…stored 
food and water was damaged, as were [the] telephone lines” (Harper, 2010, p. 9). In the 
wake of no power and little working law enforcement, law and order broke down in St. 
Croix. In an interview, Captain Paul Blayney, commander of the Coast Guard district in 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, stated that shore parties were sent ashore after Hurricane Hugo 
due to reports of “civil disorder” (FEMA, 1991). They were given the instructions to 
observe and report only, “…not to engage in any law enforcement activity…not to quell 
any of the looting” (FEMA, 1991).  
 People swam from the beach to the boats to report that there was a group of 
tourists hiding in a hotel afraid for their lives. Looting was occurring in the area, armed 
with guns that would be shot randomly; it hadn’t progressed to shots fired at people yet. 
“…basically anarchy was in effect here on St. Croix” (Bruce Hunter, FEMA 1991). 
Virgin Islands state senator, Holland Redfield stated that “…we needed to restore order 
immediately” (FEMA 1991). This request for help was supported by territorial governor 
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Alexander Farrelly, “…unless help was requested and received it was a good chance that 
the looting would escalate and civil order would prevail….made the decision and I made 
the call to the White House…[asking them] to send two military police units” (FEMA, 
1991). On September 20th, President Bush activated the National Guard, sending 1,000 
soldiers to restore order. 
 Farrelly set a curfew a few days after Hugo hit, from 6:00 pm to 6:00 am. The 
curfew hindered efforts due to work needing to continue past 6pm. The curfew was 
stepped down to ten hours, then eight, before being lifted. Armed troops patrolled St. 
Croix at all hours until well into December (FEMA, 1991). The curfew was not just for 
threat of violence and law and order purposes, but also because it was winter and there 
was no power; this meant working in the dark in an area with significant damage; this 
posed another serious risk to the safety of emergency workers and civilians. Emergency 
workers have a higher risk to their physical safety due to the nature of their work, 
purposefully entering highly damaged and unstable areas to do their jobs.  
 Hurricane Katrina, specifically where it landed in New Orleans, was a Category 
3 storm that made landfall August 29th, 2005. Two-thousand people died and those that 
failed to evacuate before the storm hit did not get the chance to do so until September 3rd, 
5 days later (Harper, 2010, p.97). They were forced to stay in the city, possibly in the 
Superdome where the living conditions caused many evacuees to become apprehensive 
and fearful for their health and safety (Harper, 2010, p.248). Around 3,000 prisoners were 
released back into New Orleans due to the effects of the storm.  
 A significant rise in crime was reported following Katrina, a 68% jump in 
reported rape, increasing rates of interpersonal violence, and rising rates of mental illness 
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(Jenkins & Phillips, 2008). One paper stated that lawlessness also delayed restoration of 
essential private sector services such as power, water, and telecommunications. Federal 
officials attempted to have law enforcement officers protect emergency responders 
against security threats due to a lack of planning, arranging this support took several 
days, during which the situation grew worse (Wyatt-Nichol & Abel, 2007, p. 574). 
 There were conflicting reports from the Superdome, “stories coming out of the 
Superdome portrayed individuals…as violent predators, as reports on assaults, murder, 
and rape were perpetuated…the reports of rape and murder were never substantiated” 
(Wyatt-Nichol & Abel, 2007, p.572). This is in direct conflict with other reports cited, 
where extensive violence was referenced (Harper, 2010, p.248). 
  The Superdome was another safety issue that affects not only emergency 
workers but civilians too. The risk of sexual assault in temporary housing is higher than 
in normal situations due to the remote locations without adequate lighting, access control, 
and physical security (Harper, 2010, p.46). "Virtually every aspect of the criminal justice 
system was damaged or destroyed by the effects of the hurricane, including the courts, 
jails, and police"(Jenkins & Phillips, 2008, p.58).  
 Emergency workers live in the same temporary housing sites that FEMA sets up 
for a community that is damaged by disaster as a place for citizens to live while their 
recovery process is in progress. It was said in an interview with Interim Superintendent 
Warren J. Riley, Chief of Operations during the storm, that “the criminal justice system 
was essentially shut down…500 police officers were lost to the impact of the storm; they 
were either evacuated or quit, many of whom never returned” (Harper, 2010, p.249). 
Other crimes had also been noted in these FEMA parks, including murder(Harper, 2010, 
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p.249). Physical security being a problem in the previously mentioned temporary housing 
parks could be attributed to a simple lack of manpower. 
 Specifically looking at cases of violence against emergency workers, it was 
found that “a number of cases of sexual assaults against volunteers who have been 
working in blackout zones, which [had no] electricity and relatively poor law 
enforcement protection” (Harper, 2010, p.46). Volunteer jobs consisted of things like 
tearing down houses and hauling away debris in all areas of the city. Crimes such as 
armed robbery, burglary, rape, and minor thefts were witnessed during the extended 
recovery process, “criminal victimization of disaster volunteers who work in various 
recovery projects” was not uncommon during Hurricane Katrina (Harper, 2010, p.45).  
 Several factors led to Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans being such a topic of 
public attention, some of it resulting from government officials visibly supporting 
recovery efforts while the logistics were not so swift. As Barnsaw et.al. states, “…while 
large cities always have crime…it was not until Hurricane Katrina disrupted the entire 
urban system that these structural problems created conditions that drew widespread 
national media attention” (Barnsaw, Nigg & Torres, p.124).  
 New Orleans has a unique organization in the urban centers where power is 
centralized on parish presidents. This coupled with “the historically volatile nature of 
Louisiana state politics” (Barnsaw, Nigg & Torres, p.124) created an unstable 
environment. The parish divisions made resource allocation difficult during and after the 
hurricane made landfall. 
 Hurricane Gustav was a hurricane that made landfall September 1st, 2008. It was 
a Category 2 when it made it to Louisiana, and it was the second most destructive of the 
6 
hurricane season in 2008. Hurricane Gustav hit the same area with similar force as the 
hurricane that preceded it by three years, Hurricane Katrina. “Property was protected 
more effectively during Gustav” (Harper, 2010, p.255). This was due to the fact that the 
National Guard was deployed before Gustav even made landfall, whereas during Katrina 
it was not until 5 days had passed. Louisiana National Guard had troops and vehicles 
stationed at high looting risk targets such as pharmacies; “The highly visible police and 
National Guard presence served as an effective deterrent” (Harper, 2010, p.255). 
 One of the reasons it is worth consideration is that it landed in New Orleans 
three years after and in the same month as Katrina. Lessons learned from Hurricane Hugo 
and Hurricane Katrina were applied in Gustav. Lessons from all three previous hurricanes 
were then applied during Hurricane Sandy for a much smoother response.  
 In contrast to these other hurricanes, Sandy is one to examine for themes and 
lessons learned from previous ones. Hurricane Sandy was a Category 1 hurricane when it 
made landfall in New Jersey and New York, having lost energy from its peak strength of 
a Category 3 when it hit Cuba. The hurricane was a hybrid storm born from a tropical 
cyclone that went north but collected energy and pressure from the Northern Atlantic 
(Walsh, 2012, p. 37). 
 Closest estimates as of February 2013 place the cost of Sandy around $50 
billion, with estimates reevaluated as time goes on. These costs make Sandy the second 
costliest hurricane to hit the United States, having struck a similar socioeconomic 
environment (Porter, 2013). The storm hit during a full moon, which exacerbated the high 
tides (Walsh, 2012, p. 40). The reach of the storm hitting so many states and high 
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population centers that the storm “rendered mutual-aid agreements…virtually 
impossible” (Walsh, 2012, p.37). 
Statement of the problem  
The safety environment must be considered and specific choices made to evaluate 
and ensure a safe environment. Disaster events result in temporary housing, putting many 
people in close quarters to each other during a very stressful period of their lives. Law 
and order can be non-effective as people will tend to their own lives before their jobs; this 
leads to a major under staffing problem as police officers and fire fighters live in the area 
that gets affected. Outside help has historically been the solution, but sometimes this help 
comes later than needed as it happened in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, where 
assistance did not arrive for five days after landfall (Drye, 2005, p.2). 
As will be shown throughout this thesis, events have been handled in different 
ways with differing results on safety. By examining the outcome of these decisions in the 
environments they were made, conclusions on best practices can be made. Both 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy are examples of disasters to learn from, as well 
as other hurricanes such as Hugo in 1989 and Gustav in 2008. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to look for reoccurring themes and issues from past 
hurricanes, focusing on themes related to emergency efforts and the safety of those 
involved. This study is attempting to find what did and did not work during preparation 
and response phases well into recovery of previous hurricanes such as Katrina to be 
applied in future hurricanes such as Sandy. These lessons need to then be applied in 
future disaster events, bringing as much of what was learned into the preparation phase to 
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be ready and available before the hurricane makes landfall. By being better prepared, 
response and recovery have an accelerated timeline with flexible operations that respond 
to sudden problems more effectively.  
Definition of terms 
For the purposes of this study, “disaster event” refers to any situation that 
violently brings a geographical location, such as a city, out of status quo; so far outside 
that normal life is brought to a halt until the situation has been recovered. “Response” is 
the time from when the hurricane disaster event is either anticipated or has made its 
influence on the area felt. “Recovery” for the purposes of this study refers to what comes 
after response, what actions are taken as well as the length of time it takes to return 
normal living in the area to return to the status quo. Whether this is a new status quo 
affected by the disaster event or returning to the previous one is dependent on the 
outcome of the event itself. 
 There are also several definitions concerning shelters and housing during disaster 
aftermath. “Emergency shelter” refers to “structurally sound havens for very short 
periods of less than twenty-four hours during and following a disaster” (Barnshaw et al., 
2006, p. 119). “Temporary shelters” provide facilities for those whose homes are without 
basic utilities or are uninhabitable due to the effects of the disaster event. “Temporary 
housing” is set up at an intermediate staging housing scenario, where victims need to get 
back to normal tasks but their homes are still uninhabitable. These housing options are 
usually apartments or rental homes. “Permanent/replacement housing” is for those who 
are unable to ever return to their homes.  
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Potential significance  
The potential for these applied lessons has many possibilities, the main one being 
a safer environment for emergency workers to do their jobs as well as civilians to survive 
and even help themselves during these tumultuous times. Lessons learned and then 
applied can ensure that there is no stereotypical breakdown of law and order, no need for 
an after-dark curfew that impedes continued recovery efforts. 
Limitations  
This study has been limited to hurricanes that have landed in large urban areas in 
the United States. It has also been limited to hurricanes that are comparable in severity. 
Further studies could include flooding that was not hurricane related as well as tornado 
disaster events; both being more plan preparation applications of lessons and heavy in 
response. 
Organization of the study 
This study is a case series focused on historical hurricanes of repute, looking at 
research and findings of academics as well as witness statements from those who 
experienced the disaster events firsthand. Themes and lessons learned are identified and 
shown how they were applied, and changes are proposed for potential future disaster 
events. Information on the storms themselves will be presented in the introduction, with 
more information found about the subject presented in the discussion section as well as 
findings portion. Previous research on the hurricanes to be considered will be presented 
in the literature review, as well as findings and issues to be discussed in the findings and 
discussion section. In this introduction, details on the hurricanes themselves are 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature Review 
 Safety of emergency personnel and citizens needs to be a top priority with 
emergency response planning. Previous literature has shown reoccurring themes on this 
subject in relation to safety during disasters. By looking at past disasters and the literature 
published on them, these themes are discovered. Looking at Hurricane Hugo and 
Hurricane Katrina, lessons on safety can be learned and applied in future disasters as they 
were in Hurricane Sandy.   
 Howard Kunreuther and Mark Pauly looked at what was learned from Hurricane 
Katrina and looked at options for programs to be put in place before disaster strikes, the 
purpose to avoid extreme expense and large losses if insurance protection and swifter 
mitigation can be achieved. The research done was of the case series variety as well as 
looking into homeowners’ insurance plans primarily, the authors stating that individuals 
did not anticipate the government coming to the rescue in the wake of a flood, hurricane, 
or earthquake but demand relief after suffering losses from a natural disaster. They also 
state that individuals move into disaster prone areas without considering these hazards 
and what they should do to protect themselves. Their research found that only 40% of 
residents in Orleans parish had flood insurance, 57.7% in St. Bernard’s, and a mere 7.3% 
in Tangipahoa (Kunreuther & Pauly, 2006, p. 5). Kunreuther and Pauly propose 
mandated comprehensive disaster insurance for all homeowners; this would avoid such 
costly recovery for the government. If homeowners are insured against such disasters as 
well, their recovery from such events can also be much swifter than if they rely on 
governmental measures. 
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 Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy conducted a study on the lessons that disasters 
have taught us historically and that it seems that these mistakes they have noted have 
often been repeated thematically. The study was a qualitative analysis of response 
organizations’ perspectives on lessons and learning, using interviews, document reviews 
produced following incidents, and a focus group retreat; all those interviewed were 
experienced emergency responders. The authors mention that not only can emergency 
responders predict problems and breakdowns before they happen, but casual observers 
can as well. Looking at several events, it has been noted that in large disasters that 
involved many agencies, a unified command is needed to coordinate efforts. This and 
many other themes were found, across many disasters, the authors recommended a “need 
for incentives to institutionalize lessons-learning processes at all levels of government” 
(Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p.17). Certain types of grants can be set up for counties in 
such a way that only those that complete Incident Command training and keep it up to 
date are eligible for federal funding, such a type of incentive might be a way to avoid 
previously repeated mistakes. 
The study also found that large scale disaster events require more resources, such 
as personnel, equipment, and supplies. The resources needed are often more resources 
than any agency could have on hand for a situation that arises, this makes resource 
acquisition and management a major function of incident management (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006, p.8). Preparation and early deployment of personnel and supplies before a 
hurricane makes landfall allows for closer supply sources as well as a forewarned supply 
chain to begin the mass acquisition effort. Overall, the study recommends learning past 
lessons and act on them as has previously not been the case. 
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Thomas Birkland and Carrie Schneider wrote a paper that looked at how prepared 
the courts were in Louisiana and New York. Birkland and Schneider did an overview of 
these trends with a focus on 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina and described the common 
features of disasters and of the management guidance available to courts (Birkland and 
Schneider, 2007). Among significant managerial trends in disaster management and the 
courts, using Katrina and 9-11 as what is known as ‘focusing events’. The research 
presented is based on secondary sources, through legal press and discussion about the 
courts in New Orleans and New York City from interviews with court officials. No 
primary research was conducted. 
 Birkland and Schneider found that, while courts did have planning and had 
different levels of preparedness (having found evidence of this, and further research 
would have been beneficial); that the day-to-day events that the courts had to attend to 
seemed to overtake the concerns of preparedness until a focusing event like the two 
presented. 9-11 and Katrina were characterized as a catalytic event that caused “training 
and planning efforts [to] have proliferated, and it is plausible to argue that court staff and 
leaders are not more familiar with emergency procedures than ever before” (Birkland and 
Schneider, 2007). This does show a reactionary view, but it is also a realistic one of 
people having lived through an event and not intimately knowing the details of how 
something works. It was noted that planning on the scale of Katrina was not prepared for 
by Louisiana courts but neither did any other government agency. 
 Pam Jenkins and Brenda Phillips studied how victims of domestic violence are 
affected during disasters. During these kinds of scenarios, support systems disappear and 
those who need that protection no longer have it. The authors gathered data from focus 
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groups of survivors and interviewed advocates; they also got incident data on domestic 
violence and observations from community meetings (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008, p.55). 
They found a sixty-eight percent jump in reported rape, and increasing rates of 
interpersonal violence (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008, p.50). There was a much higher amount 
of law enforcement in the urban center due to the disaster, but their first priority wasn’t 
specific to domestic violence issues; being more focused on the hurricane aftermath. 
“Virtually every aspect of the criminal justice system was damaged or destroyed by the 
effects of the hurricane, including courts, jails, and police” (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008, p. 
58). The change they suggested in their study was a sound idea, to train emergency 
shelters to be able to identify possible victims of domestic violence and get them away to 
a safer location if possible. 
 A study by John Barnshaw, Joanne Nigg, & Manuel Torres dovetails with what 
Jenkins & Phillips studied; they assessed the effectiveness of governmental efforts to 
provide shelter and housing for thousands of evacuees displaced by Hurricane Katrina 
(Barnshaw et al., 2006, p.113). Their data focused on the actions taken during the 
warning period of the hurricane as well as the early response period, versus the after 
effect; looking closely at the federal planning processes of the DHS and FEMA as well as 
the state of Louisiana and Texas in relation to evacuation, sheltering, and temporary 
housing (Barnshaw et al., 2006, p.114). The information they gathered came from three 
teams sent in by the Disaster Research Center to affected states September 15th-30th, 
2005. They collected data concerning housing and sheltering issues. They did interviews 
with evacuees in hotels and official shelters as well as with emergency management 
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agencies. They found that Louisiana’s Superdome was not a purposeful emergency 
shelter, but rather what is called a “last-resort refuge”. A last-resort refuge is defined as:  
“…a place for persons to be protected from high winds…unlike a shelter, there 
may be little to no water or food and possibly no utilities. Thus, a last resort 
refuge is intended only to provide best available survival protection for the 
duration of the hurricane only” (Barnshaw et al., 2006, p. 115). 
The Superdome was only intended as a refuge of last resort for those who did or 
could not evacuate before the hurricane prevented it, not as a mass shelter. Despite this, 
the National Guard delivered enough supplies to the Superdome to supply it for three 
days. Likewise the Convention Center hasn’t been designated a shelter or even a last-
resort refuge, but it was also being used as a shelter for mass amounts of people in 
dangerous conditions (Barnshaw et al., 2006, p. 116). In respect to dangerous housing, 
the authors found via interviews from evacuees that they had been transitioned from 
different housing levels non-sequentially, in both directions from emergency shelters up 
and from temporary housing back to emergency sheltering (Barnshaw et al., 2006, p. 
121). They were moved from location to location as well. This led not only instability to 
the area during an already tumultuous time, but also made it hard to ensure safety in 
housing situations. 
 As an addition to problems with providing safe housing options, there is also the 
problem of where to put manufactured housing in areas already inhabited such as 
neighborhoods in New Orleans that were not rendered inhospitable. Alka Sapat looked 
into policy learning and changes in post-disaster housing, specifically Hurricane Katrina 
and Ike. Sapat looked at legislation as well as housing policies pre- and post- Katrina. By 
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analyzing changes, they found that it was not only the housing areas that were already in 
place that were a danger, but also where they were trying to put them. 
 Sapat found that “…32 of the 64 parishes in Louisiana banned new group trailer 
sites after Katrina, which was heavily stigmatized and considered by many to represent 
‘blight’” (Sapat, 2011, p. 42). Having a hostile community around temporary housing 
makes for an unsafe environment. Sapat also found that FEMA tried to learn from this, 
attempting in post-Katrina housing situations to integrate housing into areas not 
contained inside community limits or into areas such as mobile home parks where the 
housing is appropriate for its surroundings (Sapat, 2011, p. 42). 
Russell Dynes wrote a discussion on social capital in dealing with communities 
during emergencies. Dynes considers a community as a social system, focusing on what 
happens in this system during the response phase of a disaster (the time directly after the 
event ends). Dynes’ research was focused on further analysis of previous work as well as 
further analysis of “response” research done, as he indicates, months or years after an 
event. Among his many findings, of interest and note are how a disaster can make 
volunteers flood to a community. The problem can be not a lack of volunteers, but how to 
utilize them. Dynes had several findings, a few of which contain suggestions for how to 
use social capital and use the standing social system that is already in place in a 
community rather than working against it. He also suggests involving local civic 
organizations in planning activities and utilizing existing social units instead of creating 
ad hoc ones. One interesting point he made, was that the aim of emergency planning is to 
move back to the “normal” as soon as possible, following a disaster event and not an 
opportunity to massively overhaul an area. This does not mean that there is not room for 
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improvement such as putting new measures of protection in place or rebuilding in a city 
better; but recovery means getting people back on their feet and respecting their traditions 
and social structure. 
 In light of the previous research done on Hurricane Katrina and the issues the 
emergency management conducted during that disaster event, this thesis will build on the 
themes that were identified. Hurricanes Katrina and Hugo give several lessons on what 
kind of problems arise and how they responded to them, or how we can learn from them. 
These lessons are taken and utilized in similar hurricane events, such as Hurricanes 
Gustav and Sandy. After examining these issues, suggestions for future use in hurricane 
situations in urban centers can be made. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Methods 
Context of study 
For the purposes of this thesis, a narrowed scope will be used for the situations 
considered. The safety of emergency workers and civilians is the overall focus, with a 
specific examination of hurricane disaster events in urban centers. This will be done in a 
historical case series, examining past hurricanes (notable ones being Katrina and Sandy) 
in urban centers and reoccurring themes relating to health and safety of those involved. 
Research questions 
1. What themes in emergency worker and citizen safety can be taken from Hurricane 
Katrina and similarly Hurricane Gustav? 
2. From the lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina as well as other hurricanes; 
how were they applied during Hurricane Sandy? 
3. For future disasters, what themes overall can be taken from all studied events and 
repeated or avoided? 
Two historical disasters were examined for reoccurring themes and lessons learned, to 
make proposals for changes in future disaster preparation, response, and recovery. The 
disasters were Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Katrina and 
Sandy are compared due to their similar affected environment, large urban centers with a 
bloated population; New Orleans and New York City/New Jersey specifically. Lessons 
learned from Katrina can be applied in Sandy due to the similarity of environment and 
storm circumstance. 
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Examining Katrina, we can take lessons and themes that were applied in the 
preparation and response to Sandy, as well as being applicable in future policies. Other 
Hurricanes are mentioned for relevant application of lessons from Hurricane Katrina as 
well, supporting the findings from Katrina and their successful application. The goal will 
be to determine if lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina were effectively applied 
during Hurricane Sandy. 
Data collection and analysis 
For data collection, several information sources were used; peer-reviewed articles, 
as well as education materials such as videos and books. The sources of information 
examined included interviews from disaster event survivors and responders, as well as 
planning details and outcomes of event response. Data was collected and analyzed for 
reoccurring themes found from two main hurricane events as well as anecdotes from 
other storms; Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Hugo, and Gustav are all considered. By 
looking at historical data, lessons are learned from the mistakes and victories that resulted 
from the disaster itself and the actions of those involved. 
Bias 
There are a few bases of possible bias in the sources used, the main concern being 
the bias of those who were actively experiencing the disaster event as opposed to those 
who came after and interviewed them. Personal investment in the area as well as 
perception of events can be a bias, as well as the bias of the person recording the data 
acquired from them.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussion and implications 
 The three main themes discussed have implications for how lessons learned 
from previous hurricane events, where they are utilized in more recent hurricanes. These 
themes are discussed below. 
Waiting for landfall 
 Waiting for a hurricane to make landfall before deploying assistance measures 
is a failure in process. During Katrina, disaster declaration was not done until after the 
hurricane had moved through New Orleans and left damage behind. Governor Blanco 
made requests for resources from FEMA before Katrina even made landfall. She reported 
that “she could not get the federal government to respond to her requests” (Barnsaw, 
Nigg & Torres, p.125). A conflicting report states that “Blanco was criticized for being 
reluctant to transfer power to the federal government…she requested federal assistance 
on the day Katrina made landfall…[she] declined a White House proposal to place 
control of National Guard under the federal government” (Wyatt-Nichol & Abel, 2007, p. 
567).  
 In Sandy and Gustav, disaster declarations should be made as soon as it is 
known where the incoming hurricane will make landfall. By doing so, mutual aid 
assistance can be requested quickly for supplies and additional physical presence, to be 
ready for when it is needed since as previously stated most agencies do not have what 
supplies are going to be required for response and recovery on hand.  The early 
declaration also allows for earlier military support to prevent a breakdown in law and 
order as seen in historical events. In Sandy, the declaration was made as soon as the 
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hurricane was detected as a threat to New York and New Jersey; allowing for resources 
and support to be mobilized prior to need. 
Military support to augment civilian law 
  Military support of civilian law enforcement is effective and efficient for 
restoring order to the community and protecting assets. The military support already in 
place is also a step toward the safety of emergency workers. Emergency workers working 
in teams should be protected by military units, so they do not have to worry about 
themselves and can carry on in their work. By protecting emergency workers, their 
equipment and supplies, the recovery process will also be swifter and less tumultuous for 
the community.  
 While recovery and law enforcement experiences were less than positive during 
Katrina and Hugo, Sandy and Gustav went much smoother by applying these lessons and 
attempting to improve the experience leading up to and following disaster events. 
Anecdotes from Sandy consisted more of stories of people helping each other rather than 
violence and outlaw activity. This cannot be simply a cultural difference due to all large 
cities having crime and both New Orleans and New York City being large urban centers. 
 During a disaster, the National Guard of each state can be activated by their 
Governor or nationalized by the President. The state National Guard “provides security, 
shelter, traffic control, and resources” to support the response and recovery phase of an 
emergency (Goss, 2007, p.258). They can provide helicopters, generators, portable lights, 
and communications; all of these activities and resource provision must be approved and 
then made available for use by the governor. This does add an element of delay for 
needed resources at the disaster site. The National Guard has emergency management 
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responsibilities in 26 states (Goss, 2007, p.52). The National Guard consisted of 70% of 
the military force for Hurricane Katrina, able to provide assistance to law enforcement as 
federal military branches cannot under federal law; this means swifter control of law 
enforcement that doesn’t need to wait for declarations or additional orders (Davis, T. , 
2006, p. 207). 
 During Hurricane Katrina, there were initially 15,000 National Guardsmen on 
active state duty in the surrounding states, including Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
and Florida (Goss, 2007, p.281). In just a few days that number increased to 30,000 
personnel and resources deployed through their own state emergency management 
agencies mutual aid agreements. 
 Florida put into effect legislation in 1993 an interstate compact on emergency 
relief; it was a statement that formally recognized what had previously been informal 
agreements between the Florida National Guard and the National Guard of surrounding 
states to provide emergency assistance and supplies in the event of a disaster scenario 
(Goss, 2007, p.272). These units can prearrange for personnel and equipment, shortening 
the delay that in state gubernatorial approval can cause. This reflects the current trends 
that focus on automatic aid concepts; rapid assistance through pre-set plans to receive the 
closest appropriate resource with no concern to jurisdiction. 
 More importantly, National Guard units were used to “augment civilian law 
enforcement in support of their missions” (Goss, 2007, p.281). This was important due to 
the breakdown of law and order in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This 
was also a reoccurring theme during Hurricane Hugo in 1989, military units augmenting 
civilian la’w enforcement during a disaster’s resulting disorder.  
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 Before the National Guard support civilian law enforcement, there were several 
instances of media bias that complicated response matters due to public perception. News 
stories portrayed one racial group as looting and being violent while members of another 
racial group “were portrayed as getting supplies” (Wyatt-Nichol & Abel, 2007, p.572). 
 The National Guard personnel have emergency management responsibilities to 
maintain security for firefighters, as well as their equipment during the response phase of 
Hurricane Katrina (Goss, 2007, p.53). This is an example of an effective safety measure 
for emergency worker safety; fire fighters did not have to worry about their necessary 
work tools going missing while they did their jobs. 
 During the military support of New Orleans law enforcement, it was stated that, 
“When the federal presence arrived, along with police officers and other emergency 
personnel from all over the United States, we then had a substantial population of law 
enforcement in the city… [afterwards there was] virtually no violent crime” (Harper, 
2010, p. 249-251). 
 It was stated by Donahue and Tuohy that regular duty law enforcement could 
not be expected to abruptly be pulled out of their job roles and learn incident 
management quickly while engaged in the process. “You can’t grab ‘regular’ police 
officers and firefighters and take them away from handling the stuff their handling to do 
incident management stuff” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p.7).   
 During Hurricane Hugo, a dramatic break down of law and order was 
witnessed, with the initial support units being told not to participate in any activities to 
end criminal behavior. They were told to ignore looting behaviors and to only observe 
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and report activities. As previously stated, when civilians took notice of the military 
presence they swam to the boat to ask for help as they feared for their safety.  
 Literature and witnesses state that as soon as a visible military presence had 
arrived, law and order was restored. The curfew put in place was originally 12 hours, 
which was justified with the issue of no power. The worry was that with no power to light 
the city, people out and walking in the street might be run over as well as attacked by 
those they could not see. Portable lighting with generators would need to be utilized and 
in such large quantities as to be unreasonable. 
  The curfew was a hindrance to recovery, since the curfew also applied to 
emergency workers who often needed to work past 6:00 pm. This curfew was reduced in 
hourly increments over time. 
  Hurricane Gustav is a supporting example of lessons learned from Katrina, as it 
hit in the same area and similar force as the hurricane that preceded it by three years. 
“Property was protected more effectively during Gustav” (Harper, 2010, p.255). This was 
due to the fact that the National Guard was deployed before Gustav even made landfall, 
whereas during Katrina it was not until 5 days had passed. Louisiana National Guard had 
troops and vehicles stationed at high looting risk targets, for an example would be 
pharmacies; “The highly visible police and National Guard presence served as an 
effective deterrent” (Harper, 2010, p.255). 
 The National Guard being deployed helps with the personnel issue as well as 
emergency workers that will drive to help from all over the United States. They can bring 
supplies with them. It can be argued that the National Guard is largely underutilized, 
though they have emergency management experience, training, and duties. Safety of 
24 
emergency workers is not considered to the level it should and plans for such need to be 
in place long before a disaster event. Emergency workers tend to deploy before they are 
called to respond if they see a need. 
 Preparation needs to be heavily invested in, as it is an action that mitigates how 
bad a recovery process is for affected areas. Taking the lessons from Hurricanes Hugo 
and Katrina, Hurricanes Sandy and Gustav had smoother recovery efforts. 
Hurricane Gustav hit New Orleans three years after Katrina did, and the lesson learned 
relating to law enforcement was quickly implemented. The National Guard was deployed 
before the storm hit, a lesson also reflected in the preparation for Hurricane Sandy in 
2012. 
Early declaration lends to early resources 
 In relation to disaster possibilities, Governor Cuomo of New York stated, “We 
have a 100-year flood every two years now, we [need to be] more prepared and protected 
than we have been before” (Walsh, 2012 p. 36). Preparation plans and redundant 
measures were one of the reasons New York was prepared for Hurricane Sandy, with 
sufficient notice of its landfall. NASA has orbiting satellites that forecasts the storm in 
advanced. A month before Sandy, the satellite used went dark. Before panic could occur, 
NASA activated the spare satellite they had in orbit. 
 The satellite forecasted Sandy and warnings pushed Cuomo and FEMA to 
declare it a disaster in eight states and Washington D.C. before it even made landfall. 
This allowed requests for assistance to be made before the storm even hit. Law 
enforcement had National Guard support, and no large reporting of violence such as seen 
in Katrina and Hugo was in evidence. 
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 Governor Cuomo also stated that preparation needed to be a priority, even if it 
cost more money up front; “For every $1 spent on…infrastructure, $5 in disaster-damage 
costs [are] saved” (Walsh, 2012 p. 36). In the preparation process, all the different levels 
of government from local to state to federal must have plans and programs in place to 
facilitate cooperation. “…[it could be argued] that FEMA's regional offices should have a 
stronger role in working with states to adapt the NRP, NIMS, and other FEMA programs 
to fit local and state political systems. Perhaps if this had been done, it might not have 
been necessary to militarize the response in New Orleans. This recommendation, of 
course, could not be taken without a public discourse about the proper role of FEMA. 
Since the establishment of DHS, FEMA has been diminished in size, budget and 
authority; yet it is still the primary civilian agency tasked with all aspects of disaster 
management” (Barnsaw, Nigg & Torres, 2006, p.127).  
 Measures taken for early declaration of a disaster has resulted in positive results. 
Keeping these lessons in mind, policy changes can be made to avoid negative issues from 
the past and reinforce the positive results as a standard.   
 Lessons learned are a powerful tool, but they need to be applied at multiple 
levels at the same time. “…analysis shows that disaster related learning and policy 
change occur at the state as well as the national level. The local dimension is…important 
when dealing with disasters…state and local governments have the greatest influence 
over policy tools in the realm of natural disasters” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p.104). This 
is reflected in Federal disaster policies, which are by and large designed to “induce state 
and local governments to take action” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006 p.104). 
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 Referring back to the research questions previously proposed, there are several 
themes to be taken from Hurricane Katrina in respect to emergency worker and citizen 
safety. These are tied due to the fact that emergency workers inhabit the same physical 
space as citizens during disaster periods, even staying in the same housing. Themes to be 
taken include unsafe housing situations, lack of resources for basic job use, little to no 
adequate protection or law and order, as well as late disaster declaration and the resulting 
delay in assistance. 
 This theme ties back into the previous two, from the lessons learned during 
Katrina, they were applied to Sandy in several ways. With the lessons FEMA learned 
during Katrina, they applied to Sandy. FEMA was prepared before the storm and 
responded immediately after with no delay. There wasn’t a wait for the storm to hit 
before readying and positioning personnel and resources (Naylor, B. , 2012).  
  In relation to the little to no law enforcement support, the hurricane was 
declared a disaster before it made landfall as stated and the National Guard assisted in 
law enforcement efforts from the beginning. Law enforcement having National Guard 
support, lead to no large reporting of violence such as seen in Katrina and Hugo was in 
evidence. Early declaration meant supplies and resources were released earlier and 
further needed amounts could be requested. Hurricane Gustav showed that lessons were 
learned from Katrina three years prior, by having National Guard units in place before the 
hurricane hit protecting high value targets. This reduced violent and looting behavior 
such as was seen during Katrina and Hugo.  
 Historical disaster events such as Hurricanes Katrina, Hugo, Gustav, and Sandy 
all serve as lessons learned and warnings for the future events that will impact lives. By 
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heeding the themes and knowledge, much tragedy and loss can be avoided or at least 
lessened. It is the duty of Emergency Managers and all levels of government to commit to 
learning and implementing measures taken from them. 
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Suggestions for future response use 
 
 As soon as a hurricane or any storm system threatens a community, a disaster 
declaration should immediately be made. Even if the storm never actually hits the 
community, the resources can be returned to where they were deployed from for future 
use. The resources in place are ready for use one way or the other, and if not no harm 
done besides time. 
  Military support of civilian law enforcement is effective and efficient for 
restoring order to the community and protecting assets; as soon as a disaster such as a 
hurricane is imminent, support and assets should be deployed to augment and stabilize 
and dangerous situation. To achieve this support swifter to civilian law enforcement, the 
National Guard should be utilized as they are not restricted from law enforcement while 
the federal military services are.  
 Disaster status should be declared early and acted on as soon as possible, this 
makes sure that immediate assets are made available and more can be sent on the way for 
sooner access upon need. This links to the military support option, declaration status 
means the National Guard can be federalized for response before desperate need arises. 
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